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NEGLIGENCE; INSANITY AS DEFENCE FOR TORT; WILLIAMS v.
HAYS (N. Y.), 52 N. E. 589 (1899). This was an attempt to
hold the captain of a brig responsible for negligently causing the
destruction of his vessel. The jury found that an ordinarily pru-
dent man would have avoided the loss. The defendant claimed
that while doing the acts complaipied of he was unconscious and
knew nothing of what occurred; that in fact he was, from some
cause, insane, and therefore not responsible for the loss of the
vessel. At the trial the case was submitted to the jury on the
theory that the defendant, if sane, was guilty of negligence, but if
insane, was not responsible. Judgment being rendered in favor of
the defendant, an appeal was taken, and the Court of Appeals, in
an opinion by Earl, J., overruled the lower court, on the general
rule that an insane person is just as responsible for his torts as a
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sane person, except where intention is an essential ingredient.
No distinction was drawn between negligence and. other torts, but
it was suggested that had the insanity of the captain resulted from
his efforts to save the ship during the storm through which it
passed, a different case might be presented. On the second trial
of the case the lower court assumed that the captain's insanity was
the result of his great exertions to save his ship, but failed to see
how that fact presented any exception to the principle laid down,
that a person of unsound mind is responsible for the consequences
of acts which in thelcase of a sane person would be negligent. The
court of appeals held that this carried the law of negligence to an
unreasonable point, and again reversed the judgment.
The responsibility of an insane person for negligence is the sub-
ject of much discussion among the text writers. See Harvard Law
Review, May, 1896, p. 65. Wharton, in his book on Negligence,
observes that negligence is not imputable to persons of unsound
mind, the law intervening to protect them, at least, as tenderly as
it does persons capable of taking care of themselves. See Chic. &-
A. R. R. Co. v. Gregory, 58 Ill. 226 (I871). Similar rules are
laid down in Beven on Negligence, 2d Ed., pp. 52-55 ; Jaggard
on Torts, Vol. II, p. 872; and by Clerk and Linsdell on Torts,
pp. i, 34. The opposite view is held by Shearman & Redfield
on Negligence, Vol. I, sec. 121i; Pollock on Torts, p. 46; and
Cooley on Torts, 2d Ed., 1 7. Cooley sees no distinction between
responsibility for negligence and any -other tort, such as trespass.
He points out (p. 98) that the wrong "consists in the injury done,
and not commonly in the purpose or mental or physical capacity of
the person or agent doing it." He recognizes that there is an
apparent hardship, but declares it to be a question of policy, a
choice having to be made between two innocent parties. The
American cases follow Mr. Cooley's view with scarcely a dissenting
voice. On insanity as a defence for torts in general, see Beals v.
See, Io Pa. 56 (1848) ; Lancaster Co. Bank v. Moore, 78 Pa. 407
(1875); Wirebach'sEx. v. FirstlVat'lBank, 97 Pa. 543 (188z) ;
Ins. Co. v. Shewalter, 40 W. N. C. (Pa.) 8o (1896); Jewell v.
Colby, 66 N. H. 399 (I89O) ; McGee v. Willing, 31 Leg. Int.
(Pa.) 37 (1874) ; SheApardv. Wood, i Lanc. (Pa.) 175 (1884);
Weaver v. Ward, Hobart, 134 (1724); Aloore v. Crawford, 17
Vt. 499 (1845); Bush v. Pettibone, 4 N. Y. 3oo (185o); Irom
v. Schonmaker, 3 Barb. 650 (1848) ; Cross v. Kent, 32 Md. 581 ;
Behrens v. McKenzie, 23 Iowa, 343 (1867) ; Wardv. Constater
4 Bax. 64 (1874); McIntyre v. Sholty, 13 N. E. 239 (1887).
The following are cases where the tort complained of was negli-
gence: Neal v. Gillett, 23 Conn. 437 (1855) ; Aorain v. Devlin,
132 Mass. 87 (1882); Brown v. Hoewe, 9 Gray, 84 (x857);
Beals v. See, ro Pa. 56 (1843). Ordronaux's Judicial Aspects of
Insanity, Chapter VII, contains a collection of cases on this subject.
The case of Chic. & A. R. R. Co. v. Gregory, 58 Ill. 226
(x871), is cited by Wharton as supporting his view of the subject.
NOTES.
In that case the court refused to impute contributory negligence to
an imbecile child who sought to recover damages for injuries
received upon a railroad track. The case, however,. does not seem.
to support the rule contended for. 'It is true that an insane person
cannot be said to be really negligent, but, as stated in Karow v.Z*ns.
Co. (Wis.), zS N. W. 27, damages are recovered "not on the
ground of negligence, as that word is usually understood, but in the
language of Chief Justice. Gibson (Beas v. See, supra,) on the
principle that, where a loss must be borne by one of two innocent
persons, it should be borne by him who ocpasioned it." This
being the reason of the rule adopted by the cases, it will be seen
that the facts in Chic. &- A. -R. R. Co. v. Gregory do not fall
within its spirit, and the case is no authority against it.
Accepting the doctrine of the cases, that insanity'is not a good
excuse for negligence, the lower court, in the case before us, found
that the condition of the captain was brought about by his vnceas-
ing efforts to save his ship. For more than two days he was
constantly on duty, refusing to leave the deck until he was ex-
hausted. Finally he went to his cabin, took a large dose of quinine
and lay down, and from that time until he found himself in the
life saving station, he was found to have been deranged. As stated
above, however, this state of facts did not, in the eyes of the trial
judge, affect the question. The view of the Court of Appeals was
that it altered the case entirely. The Court of Appeals cites no
cases in support of its view, but reasons as follows: "The man is
not yet born in whom there is not a limit to his physical endurance,
and, when that limit has been passed, he must yield to laws over
which he has no control. . . . What careful and prudent man
could do more than to care for his vessel until overcome by physical
and mental exhaustion? To do more was impossible. And yet
we are told that he must or be responsible." That one should be
held responsible for omitting to do impossible things is looked upon
by the court as an absurdity, and as the law does not suffer an
absurdity, the defendant was held not liable. At first blush it
would seem equally absurd to hold any insane person responsible
for negligence, diligence being to such persons a practical impossi-
bility. But it is submitted that the Court of Appeals is right, and
the trial judge wrong, not because insanity should be a defence for
negligence, but because the real defence of the.captain was not his
insanity, but the fact that he had done all that an ordinary prudent
man could do under the circumstances and could do no more.
Had he been swept overboard by* the storm and lost, the case
would have been no stronger. The principle involved is the same
as that in the case in which a driver of ordinary skill and prudence
lost control of his horses, and was held not to be liable for damage
sustained by a passer-by. See Brown v. Collins (1873), 53 N. H.
442, and cases there commented upon.
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NEGLIGENCE; INJURIES SUSTAINED BY A PERSON WHILE A TRES-
PASSER. IN Qugiley v. Clough, 53 N. E. 884-a Massachusetts
case decided in May, 1899-suit was brought by an involuntary
trespasser for injuries sustained during the trespass and recovery
was denied. The case arose on the following state of facts:
The defendant was the owner of a corner property; a house
stood on his lot, but at some distance from each of the inter-
secting streets, and passers-by were in the habit of taking a short
cut across the lot. To prevent this he built a fence from his house
to the street corner and later made it of barbed wire. The plain-
tiff coming along the street one dark night, by mistake left the
sidewalk, ran into the fence, and received injuries for which he
brought suit with the result stated above.
The case of Howland v. Vincent, io Metc. 371 (1845), cited
by the court, is in accord with this decision. There the owner of
land had made an excavation for a cellar about a foot or two from
the sidewalk and had taken no precaution to prevent passers-by
from falling in. The plaintiff in that case met with an accident
in much the same manner as in the case of Quigley v. Clough, but
no recovery was allowed him. 'The case of Afclntire v. Raberts,
149 Mass. 450 (x889), also supports this view.
The well-known spring-gun case, in which a man has been held
liable for injuries inflicted upon trespassers by concealed spring
guns, is referred to; but a substantial distinction is made by Judge
Holmes, when he points out in that case-Bird v. Holbrook, 4
Bing. 6?8-the intention of the defendant was to inflict personal
injuries upon the trespasser, whoever he might be; and the case
was much as though the defendant had found one trespassing on
his land and then assaulted him. In Quigley's case the court does
not admit that any intention to injure existed, but regards the
barbed wire fence as a natural means of preventing the public from
walking across the defendant's lot and a means wholly devoid of
malice or intent to injure.
As against the position taken by the court, the case of Aarble v.
Ross, 124 Mass. 44 (1877), was strongly urged. There the owner
of a field kept in it a vicious stag. A trespasser received injuries
from this stag, and the court said that an action could be main-
tained to recover damages for the injuries received, provided the
trespasser did not go on the land with knowledge of the danger.
It was said that a duty vested upon the owner of keeping and
restraining the stag at his peril. But here again an apparent dis-
tinction exists; for the stag is the active cause of the injuries
sustained, while in the case in hand the fence is an inert passive
condition of the injuries. In the case of Marble v. Ross, the court
says, "The unlawful character of his (i. e. the trespasser's) act did
not contribute to his injury or affect the defendant's negligence."
Such a statement could not be made with regard to the facts in
Quigley's case. So, on the other hand, in Marble v. Ross, the
trespass was a mere condition of the injury, while in Quigley's case
it was the cause.
